

Modelling CANDO

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In collaboration with :

- Alistair Pollitt PhD Student
- Patrick Degenaar Brain pacemaker eng. (NCL) lead

Motivation


- Most medical device companies are small
- CE-marking safety-critical software is tricky:
 - Regulation and standards only provide guidelines
 - Engineers are not trained in dependable software techniques
- Myriad of regulatory documentation
 - Over 20 different standards to adhere to and address
 - Lack of clarity for a pathway to certification
 - Software is regulated / classified by IEC62304
- Case study selection
 - Safety-critical software for a medical device
 - Prior work done by Newcastle

Methodology

- Application of model based techniques to medical device
 - Model-based formalisms for the design (i.e. FSM + properties)
 - Code-level verification for C/C++ (partial/total correctness)
 - **Link solutions to regulatory process is crucial**
- Have a direct link with risk/hazard profile
 - Ensures stakeholders and regulator care about the formal result
 - Enables clear demonstration of what the approach can achieve


Design / Verification Tools - various

- Model-based verification languages and tools
 - CSP/FDR, MAL/NuSMV : risk assessment properties model checking
 - VDM/Overture, Isabelle: symbolic simulation and proof of specific properties
- Code-level verification languages and tools
 - Dafny/Z3, C/Frama-C : specification discovery
 - C and C++/eCv : MISRA compliance, auditable correctness proofs




Socio-technical experiments

Infant Dialyser (NHS)
2008 – 2017 (2014)




Brain Pacemaker (EPSRC/CANDO)
2014 – 2022 (2016)



Brain Pacemaker (mid point adoption)

- Optogenetic stimulation (i.e. electrical signal input; light signal output)
- Embedded software within the controller unit for closed-loop stimulation
- External software for wireless download diagnostic information and upload control parameters



What's been verified?

- Verifying the optrode CMOS chip command interface API:
 - Optrodes communication over SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface)
 - FSM controlling low-level optrode functionality
- FSM control software implemented in C (~3KLOC) for a Freescale chip
- Verification boundaries
 - Not verifying generated device-driver code (~5KLOC)
 - Not verifying dependant libraries for printed hardware (~110KLOC)


FSM Visualisation

```




const unsigned char /* State transition table */
MANUAL_STATE_TABLE[OPTRODE_CMD_STATES][OPTRODE_CMD_EVENTS] =
{
    /* TOUT CONT ERROR SPI_TX_FINISH SPI_RX_FINISH LED_ON_E SET_VLED_E SET_BRE_E LED_ALL_OFF_E PROG_DELAY_DIAG_E READ_DIAG READ_LFP GET_CMD */
    /* STATE 0 */ 1, 1, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // start
    /* STATE 1 */ 1, 2, 32, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, // idle
    /* STATE 2 */ 2, 3, 32, 2, 2, 5, 6, 9, 12, 13, 1, 1, 1, // get_cmd
    /* STATE 3 */ 3, 4, 32, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 26, 27, 2, // LED_off
    /* STATE 4 */ 4, 4, 32, 28, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 2, // send_packet
    /* STATE 5 */ 5, 4, 32, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 2, // LED_on
    /* STATE 6 */ 6, 7, 32, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 5, 2, // set_vLED
    /* STATE 7 */ 7, 7, 32, 29, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 2, // send_packet
    /* STATE 8 */ 8, 4, 32, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7, 2, // set_sDAC
    /* STATE 9 */ 9, 7, 32, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 8, 8, 2, // set_bre
    /* STATE 10 */ 10, 10, 32, 30, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 9, 9, 2, // send_packet
    /* STATE 11 */ 11, 4, 32, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 10, 10, 2, // set_dDAC
    /* STATE 12 */ 12, 4, 32, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 11, 11, 2, // LED_all_off
    /* STATE 13 */ 13, 4, 32, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 12, 12, 2, // prog_delay_diag
    /* STATE 14 */ 14, 14, 32, 14, 14, 14, 14, 14, 14, 14, 13, 13, 2, // prog_op_mem_1
    /* STATE 15 */ 15, 15, 32, 31, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 14, 14, 2, // send_packet
    /* STATE 16 */ 16, 4, 32, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 15, 15, 2, // prog_op_mem_2
    /* STATE 17 */ 17, 4, 32, 17, 17, 17, 17, 17, 17, 17, 16, 16, 2, // run_mem
    /* STATE 18 */ 18, 4, 32, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 17, 17, 2, // prog_clk_cnt
    /* STATE 19 */ 19, 4, 32, 19, 19, 19, 19, 19, 19, 19, 18, 18, 2, // reset_ana
    /* STATE 20 */ 20, 4, 32, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 19, 19, 2, // set_ana
    /* STATE 21 */ 21, 4, 32, 21, 21, 21, 21, 21, 21, 21, 20, 20, 2, // config_rec
    /* STATE 22 */ 22, 4, 32, 22, 22, 22, 22, 22, 22, 22, 21, 21, 2, // prog_ID
    /* STATE 23 */ 23, 4, 32, 23, 23, 23, 23, 23, 23, 23, 22, 22, 2, // dummy
    /* STATE 24 */ 24, 25, 32, 24, 24, 24, 24, 24, 24, 24, 23, 23, 2, // read_LED
    /* STATE 25 */ 25, 25, 32, 28, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 24, 24, 2, // send_packet
    /* STATE 26 */ 26, 25, 32, 26, 26, 26, 26, 26, 26, 26, 25, 25, 2, // read_diag
    /* STATE 27 */ 27, 25, 32, 27, 27, 27, 27, 27, 27, 27, 26, 26, 2, // read_LFP
    /* STATE 28 */ 28, 32, 32, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28, 27, 27, 2, // receive_packet
    /* STATE 29 */ 29, 8, 32, 29, 29, 29, 29, 29, 29, 29, 28, 28, 2, // receive_packet
    /* STATE 30 */ 30, 11, 32, 30, 30, 30, 30, 30, 30, 30, 29, 29, 2, // receive_packet
    /* STATE 31 */ 31, 16, 32, 31, 31, 31, 31, 31, 31, 31, 30, 30, 2, // receive_packet
    /* STATE 32 */ 1, 1, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 31, 31, 2, // cmd_finish
    /* STATE 33 */ 1, 1, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32 // cmd_finish
};

void (*MANUAL_STATE_ADD[OPTRODE_CMD_STATES])(void) =
{
    /*0-3 */ &start, &idle, &get_cmd, &LED_off,
    /*4-7 */ &send_packet, &LED_on, &set_vLED, &send_packet,
    /*8-11 */ &set_sDAC, &set_bre, &send_packet, &set_dDAC,
    /*12-15*/ &LED_all_off, &prog_delay_diag, &prog_op_mem_1, &send_packet,
    /*16-19*/ &prog_op_mem_2, &run_mem, &prog_clk_cnt, &reset_ana,
    /*20-23*/ &set_ana, &config_rec, &prog_ID, &dummy,
    /*24-27*/ &read_LED, &send_packet, &read_diag, &read_LFP,
    /*28-31*/ &receive_packet, &receive_packet, &receive_packet, &receive_packet,
    /*32-35*/ &cmd_finish
};



```



FSM Visualisation




FSM Visualisation



FSM Verification

- Modelled the FSM a map from event to state to state
 - Abstracted away from the C implementation details
 - Invariants are not as fiddly as in C code annotations
 - Translated back to eCv annotations to verify the C code
- Modelling done in VDM
 - Symbolic simulation, 98% coverage, QC, Isabelle proof
 - 1053LOC VDM, 45-50 FSM invariants, 272POs
 - Original effort had 136 POs (2019 POG), 10 QC failed!
- Implemented optrode CMOS chip command-set APIs
 - The model can simulate executions of the FSM loop
 - Independent of hardware, which is fiddly and hard to debug
 - **Whole API simulation only one (main) command path proof.**



PO Type	Total (272)
Provable	93 (34%)
Maybe	147 (54%)
Unchecked	32 (12%)
Failed	0

Finite State Machine (FSM) Analysis


- FSM invariants led to rearrangement of VDM operations from C.
- Identified unreachable states in C + incorrect/inadequate transitions.
- Examples of identified invariants:
 - Send and receive states must transition to themselves on transmission finish events – ensure all bytes of the packets are processed
 - Packet creation states must go to a send state on a continue event – if they don't, the packet can be overwritten by another packet creation state.
 - Receive packet states must go to the command finished or a stage 2 packet creation state – command is either finished or a new packet must be created
- Simulated system satisfied these invariants.

eCv Verification of C FSM


Translated VDM to eCv annotations to verify the C code

Verifying the FSM in C (2 versions):

- *Column struct*
 - invariants in terms of events
 - event -> (state -> state)



- *Row struct*
 - invariants in terms of states
 - state -> (event -> state)



```
(value.my_event == SPI_TX_FINISH =>
    (forall x in all_states :-
        ((x in send_states_eCvset) =>
            (value.transitions[x] == x))
        &&
        (!(x in send_states_eCvset) =>
            (value.transitions[x] == error_s))
    )
)

(check_if_send_state(value.my_state) =>
    ((check_if_receive_state(value.transitions[CONT]))
    &&
    (value.transitions[SPI_TX_FINISH] == value.my_state))
    &&
    (forall x in value.transitions.indices :-
        (x != CONT && x != SPI_TX_FINISH) =>
            (value.transitions[x] == error_s )
    )
)
```

- FSM Table is then constructed as an array of columns or rows

FSM Data Packet Construction

- Several progressive iterations and steps to discharge C POs:

- Remove errors produced during verification
- Discharge further verification conditions
- Simplify the verification process

Communication Packet - 24 bits		
Address: 6 bits	Command: 6 bits	Data: 12 bits

- Original package assembly contained own bit-vector expression, e.g.:

```
Packet = (((addr & BITS_6) << 18) | ((cmd & BITS_6) << 12) | (data & MASK)) & BITS_24);
```

```
// Hardware instruction: binary package construction
```

```
inline packet_t assemble_packet(const bits_6_t addr, const bits_6_t cmd, const bits_12_t data)
                                ghost(const packet_data_t data_length_ghost)
```

```
pre (range_check(DATA_LOW, data_length_ghost, data))
```

```
post ( result == (((addr << ADDR_SHIFT) | (cmd << CMD_SHIFT) | data ) & BITS_24))
```

```
{
```

```
    unsigned long packet_assembly =
```

```
        (assemble_packet_addr(addr) |
         assemble_packet_cmd(cmd) |
         assemble_packet_data(data) ghost(data_length_ghost));
```

```
    return (packet_t) (packet_assembly & BITS_24);
```

```
}
```

```
inline packet_t assemble_packet_addr(const bits_6_t addr) const
```

```
pre (range_check(ADDR_LOW, ADDR_HIGH, (addr << ADDR_SHIFT)))
```

```
post (range_check(ADDR_LOW, ADDR_HIGH, result))
```

```
post (result == old addr << ADDR_SHIFT)
```

```
{    return ((packet_t)addr << ADDR_SHIFT); }
```


- Led to reduction from 64 to 8 C POs per packet construction
- Verification effort decrease (e.g. 6K to 460 C POs)
- Less POs due to lesser up/down casts

Timeline


Inception
(2014-2015)



Design
(2014-2018)



Rodent Trials
(2017-2018)



Primate Trials
(2019)

Human Trials
(2020)

Conclusion

- Need to be careful not to be lost in translation
 - Model-based formalisms for the design (i.e. FSM + properties)
 - Code-level verification for C/C++ (partial/total correctness)
 - **VDM was crucial to identify hidden invariants from the C code**
 - **“Killer” C errors discovered early (using VDM and Isabelle)**
- Socio technical experiments
 - Early adoption brings more benefits
 - Important to have regulator/notified body on-side
 - **Link solutions to regulatory process is crucial**